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263 
TITLE VII AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE 
RULE: EVALUATING THE NOT-SO EQUITABLE 
REMEDY IN EEOC v. CONSOL ENERGY 
Abstract: On June 12, 2017, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Vir-
ginia to refuse an offset to a Title VII damage award by the amount of pension 
payments received following the plaintiff's constructive discharge. In doing so, 
the court adopted a new interpretation of the collateral source rule and its ap-
plicability in employment discrimination pay awards. The effect of this decision 
is to further compound a split of authority between multiple federal courts of ap-
peals regarding the treatment of certain benefits in the wake of employment dis-
crimination. This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit's decision is incon-
sistent with the statutory intent of Title VII to provide equitable remedies, and 
advocates for an approach to fashioning pay awards that examines the totality of 
circumstances facing employer and employee following employment discrimina-
tion litigation.  
INTRODUCTION 
Every year, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the 
“EEOC”) receives nearly 90,000 claims of workplace discrimination.1 Accord-
ingly, the agency engages in substantial litigation to prosecute employers in-
fringing upon the federally protected rights of American employees.2 Each 
time the EEOC goes to trial, it has two goals: to deter the employer from en-
gaging in future discrimination, and to correct the injuries suffered as a result 
of the employer’s unlawful practices.3 
The EEOC undertook this mission in its 2013 charge against Consol En-
ergy, Inc. for its alleged failure to accommodate the sincerely held religious 
beliefs of Beverly Butcher.4 The litigation resulted in a victory for Butcher, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS (CHARGES FILED WITH 
EEOC) FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2017, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm 
[http://perma.cc/5ZQB-Z7PP] (Oct. 15, 2017) (reporting an average of 89,889 charges resolved by the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) between the years of 2014 through 2016). 
 2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, -5 (2012) (charging the EEOC with preventing unlawful employment 
practices through the investigation and litigation of discrimination claims). 
 3 See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, OVERVIEW, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.
cfm [http://perma.cc/4USU-895X] (identifying the vision of the EEOC as “Justice and Equality in the 
Workplace” and their mission to put a stop to, and remedy, unemployment discrimination). 
 4 Complaint and Jury Trial Demand at 1, 6–8, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Consol 
Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 1:13CV00215), 2013 WL 5397409 (stating the nature 
of the action as an effort to remedy the unlawful discrimination against Beverly Butcher by Consol 
Energy and praying for relief in the form of a permanent injunction, compensation for emotional dam-
ages, past and future losses to income, and punitive damages). 
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whose award of nearly half a million dollars in damages was affirmed by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in U.S. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission v. Consol Energy, Inc. in 2017.5 In rendering this deci-
sion, the Fourth Circuit clarified its own position regarding the incorporation 
of fringe benefits into an equitable damages award: that all benefits not issued 
directly by the employer to the employee are considered collateral and there-
fore cannot be offset from an award of front or back pay.6 This rule is similar 
to the position adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third and Seventh 
Circuits, and at odds with the discretionary approach advocated by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits.7 
This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit erred in removing a matter 
of discretion from the capable determination of trial courts.8 This Comment 
further argues that the Second Circuit has adopted a rule that better fits the 
statutory goals of Title VII, specifically that of providing an equitable remedy 
to the victim of unlawful discrimination.9 Part I of this Comment introduces 
the collateral source rule, discusses the split in authority between federal courts 
of appeals regarding the offset of certain benefits from damage awards, and 
examines the factual and procedural history of Consol Energy.10 Part II of this 
Comment discusses the different approaches the Fourth Circuit has taken in 
categorizing fringe benefits over time.11 Finally, Part III advocates for a rule 
affording district courts broad latitude in deciding issues of equitable relief.12 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
Courts have adopted a number of different approaches in calculating dam-
age awards following employment discrimination verdicts. Section A of this 
Part examines the remedy provision of Title VII and describes the interplay 
between the collateral source rule and damage awards. Section B of this part 
                                                                                                                           
 5 860 F.3d at 140, 152 (affirming the district court’s award of $434,860.74 in damages). 
 6 Id. at 149 (discussing the court's treatment of pension payments as a collateral source). 
 7 See Gelof v. Papineau, 829 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that unemployment compen-
sation payments could not be offset from back pay awards); McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, 740 F.2d 214, 
110–11 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1202 (1985) (concluding that it is imper-
missible to deduct pension plan benefits from back pay awards); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 
F.2d 77, 85 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that deductibility questions should be left within 
the trial court’s discretion). But see Dailey v. Societe Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 460 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that district courts may exercise discretion in offsetting unemployment benefits from a back 
pay award); Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1107 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming the decision by the 
United States District Court for the District of Maine to offset a lump sum pension payment from a 
front pay award); Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 210 (5th Cir. 1986) (ordering an offset for 
retirement plan benefits from an age discrimination damage award). 
 8 See infra notes 110–122 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 118–122 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–51 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 55–95 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
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details the split of authority regarding the application of the collateral source 
rule to retirement benefits. 
A. Fringe Benefits as Collateral Source Benefits 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (“Title VII”) has two primary objectives: ending unlawful discrimination 
in the workforce, and making victims whole who have endured unlawful dis-
crimination.13 To achieve these ends, the enforcement provision of Title VII 
provides courts with a full suite of equitable remedies and broad discretion in 
fashioning damage awards, which are determined in a separate evidentiary 
hearing following a jury verdict.14 These evidentiary hearings feature testimo-
ny from economic experts on both sides, each attempting to quantify the mone-
tary benefits the victim would have received but for the unlawful discrimina-
tion.15 One issue during such proceedings is whether fringe benefits should be 
classified as either collateral sources or interim earnings.16 
Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by a plaintiff wholly 
independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor do not diminish the damages the 
plaintiff can receive.17 This ensures that tortfeasors are not able to minimize 
their liability simply because the victim received incidental benefits as a result 
of the tort.18 Generally speaking, payments that serve as additional compensa-
tion from a source other than the employer are categorized as collateral.19 This 
                                                                                                                           
 13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (de-
riving the statutory aims of Title VII from the 1972 Conference Committee Report, where Congress 
voted against limiting the enforcement provisions of the Act). 
 14 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (providing for injunctive relief, including reinstatement, back 
pay, front pay, compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, or “any other equitable relief as the 
court deems appropriate”); see, e.g., Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 140 (stating that an evidentiary hear-
ing followed the jury verdict to determine an equitable remedy). In some circuits, quantification of a 
front pay award is a matter for the jury. See Fite v. First Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass’n, 861 F.2d 884, 893 
(6th Cir. 1988); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int’l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 15 See, e.g., Report or Affidavit of Dr. Homayoun Hajiran, MBA, Ph.D. at 5, Consol Energy, 860 
F.3d 131 (No. 113CV00215), 2014 WL 878251 at *1734, 1739 (countering the report of Dr. Sovan 
Tun with reconstructed calculations of Butcher’s economic damages); Report or Affidavit of Dr. So-
van Tun, Ph.D. at 3, Consol Energy, 860 F.3d 131 (No. 113CV00215), 2014 WL 8728251 (providing 
a calculation of gross pay lost after termination). 
 16 See, e.g., Report or Affidavit of Dr. Homayoun Hajiran, supra note 15, at 5 (offsetting the back 
pay award to Butcher by the pension distributions he received following termination, indicating cate-
gorization of such payments as interim earnings). 
 17 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.8(1) 266–69 (2d ed. 1993). For example, if a plaintiff 
receives payments from an insurer for medical expenses, this does not reduce the amount he is able to 
receive from the tortfeasor. Id. at 267. 
 18 See id. at 267. (exploring as rationale for the rule the suggestion that the wrongdoer would be 
permitted a windfall if allowed credit for an unconnected benefit that reduces the plaintiff’s damages). 
 19 See, e.g., England v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 194 F.3d 265, 273–74 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that 
a recovery need not be offset by any amount of benefits received from a source that is not the tortfea-
sor). For example, payments received from a health insurer for medical expenses are categorized as 
collateral. See, e.g., Samsel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 P.3d 281, 290 (Ariz. 2002) (“Recovery of expenses 
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distinction becomes less clear when an employer bears some financial respon-
sibility for a payment received by an aggrieved employee, but the payment 
itself is issued by a third party.20 For example, state-issued unemployment ben-
efits funded by mandated tax contributions from the employer cannot be said 
to be entirely distinct from the employer’s responsibilities to the employee.21 
Thus, courts have reached different conclusions regarding the offset of non-
wage compensation that is partially or entirely funded by the employer.22 
The Supreme Court considered the issue of collateral sources within the 
context of an employment discrimination pay award in its 1951 decision, Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Gullet Gin Co.23 The Court held that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) was correct not to deduct payments 
from the state unemployment fund in its calculation of a back pay award, even 
though the unemployment payments were partially funded through employer 
tax contributions.24 The Court concluded that the unemployment payments 
belonged to an independent social policy because the employer maintained a 
duty to make contributions independent from the employee's right to receive 
the benefits.25 The payments were not derived from a distinct obligation to the 
aggrieved employee (as per a settlement agreement, for example) and were 
therefore determined to be collateral in nature.26 Accordingly, the Court rea-
soned that the injured employee was not made more than whole in receiving 
both the pay award and unemployment compensation.27 
B. Applying the Collateral Source Rule to Retirement Benefits 
Despite this precedent, there continues to be a clear divide among federal 
courts of appeal on whether employer-funded benefits should be offset from 
                                                                                                                           
from both medical payments coverage and other sources has long been both recognized and accepted 
in Arizona and elsewhere.”). 
 20 See Hamlin v. Charter Twp. of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 435 (6th Cir. 1999) (engaging in a pro-
longed analysis to determine if a disability pension is collateral). 
 21 See Phillips v. W. Co. of N. Am., 953 F.2d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the collateral 
source determination as necessitating consideration of not only the source of the benefits but of their 
character as well). 
 22 Compare Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep’t, 697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming 
the order of a United States Magistrate to deduct unemployment compensation benefits from a back 
pay award under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act), with Craig, 721 F.2d at 85 (adopting a 
rule that unemployment benefits may never be deducted from a back pay award under Title VII). 
 23 N.L.R.B. v. Gullet Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 363 (1951). 
 24 See id. at 364 (disagreeing with the defendant’s argument that the payments constitute direct 
benefits rather than collateral payments). 
 25 See id. (citing In re Cassaretakis, 289 N.Y. 119, 126 (1942) (creating the distinction between an 
employer’s duty to its employees versus its duty to the State)). 
 26 See id. (noting that the payments were not made to discharge the employer of liability for the tort). 
 27 See id. at 365 (concluding that the employee was not overcompensated). 
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back and front pay awards as a matter of law.28 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third and Seventh Circuits have both incorporated the analysis of Gullet 
Gin Co. into their determinations that benefits funded in part by the tortfeasor 
should be deemed collateral sources and, accordingly, remain exempt from 
award reductions.29 By contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First, Sec-
ond, and Fifth Circuits have specifically declined to issue a rule barring an off-
set for retirement benefits by labeling such payments as collateral source in-
come.30 In doing so, the courts have reduced damage awards arising out of 
successful employment discrimination litigation by the amount collected in 
retirement benefits following discharge.31  
The Third and Seventh Circuits have implemented a rule against offset-
ting employer-funded benefits, also known as fringe benefits, from an award of 
back or front pay when such payments are received incidentally as a result of 
the wrongful discharge or involuntary retirement in employment discrimina-
tion cases.32 In McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., the Third Circuit specifically 
considered the question of offsetting pension benefits from a back pay award 
in an age discrimination settlement and concluded that doing so was improper 
for a number of interrelated reasons.33 First, allowing such an offset would un-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. O’Grady, 857 F.2d 383, 389–91 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(following the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in adopting a “flat rule forbidding the setoff 
of pension . . . benefits”); McDowell, 740 F.2d at 217–18 (holding that pension plan benefits are col-
lateral). But see Guthrie, 803 F.2d at 209–10 (stating that retirement benefits coming from an employ-
er are not collateral and should be offset from a damages award); Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 
F.2d 76, 86–87 (2d Cir. 1983) (offsetting pension benefits from an award of back pay). 
 29 See O’Grady, 857 F.2d at 389–91 (noting with approval the reasoning in Gullet Gin that re-
tirement benefits belong to a state policy rather than the policy driving discrimination pay awards); 
McDowell, 740 F.2d at 217–18 (citing to Gullet Gin in reaching its determination that awards of back 
pay should not be affected by pension payments received following termination). 
 30 See Lussier, 50 F.3d at 1111 (rejecting the invitation by claimants to create a bright-line rule 
forbidding the deduction of collateral source payments); Guthrie, 803 F.2d at 209–10 (holding that 
payments from a retirement fund are not collateral); Hagelthorn, 710 F.2d at 86–87 (omitting refer-
ence to the collateral source rule in affirming a decision to offset pension payments from a damages 
award). 
 31 See Lussier, 50 F.3d at 1113 (affirming a decision to reduce a front pay award by the excess 
compensation received in retirement benefits); Guthrie, 803 F.2d at 210 (ordering that a back pay 
award be reduced by amount of pension payments received); Hagelthorn, 710 F.2d at 87 (finding no 
error in the decision to offset a back pay award by a portion of the lump sum pension payment collect-
ed following retirement). 
 32 O’Grady, 857 F.2d at 389–91; McDowell, 740 F.2d at 217–18. Back pay and front pay are 
among the remedies explicitly authorized by the remedy provision of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(1) (2012). Back pay, awarded in most employment discrimination cases, compensates individuals 
for the wages and other employment benefits she would have enjoyed had she not suffered unlawful 
discrimination. See Moody, 422 U.S. 405 at 421 (stating that back pay should be consistently granted 
in Title VII cases in order to further the statutory purposes of the Act). Front pay exists to compensate 
a victim of discrimination for her future lost earnings in the event that reinstatement is not possible or 
appropriate. See Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1423 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining the award of 
front pay as an alternative remedy to reinstatement). 
 33 McDowell, 740 F.2d at 217–18. 
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dermine the mission to end workplace discrimination by reducing the damages 
owed by the defendant.34  Second, as noted by Gullet Gin Co., pension plans 
are intended to serve a larger social policy and are therefore collateral despite 
being funded through employer contributions.35 Lastly, and most importantly 
in the view of the Third Circuit, allowing a deduction would provide a windfall 
to the discriminatory employer by significantly reducing the amount of liqui-
dated damages the employee would be entitled to otherwise.36 
In 1988, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit similarly adopted a 
flat rule barring an offset for pension payments in EEOC v. O'Grady.37 The 
court cited with approval the Third Circuit's reasoning that pension plan bene-
fits are independent in nature because they belong to a social policy separate 
from that dictating payment for lost wages.38 The Seventh Circuit, however, 
went further in articulating its sympathy for discrimination plaintiffs by ac-
knowledging the possibility of double compensation for the claimant, and con-
cluding that such an outcome was preferable to giving a break to the employ-
er.39 Simply put, the court stated its acceptance for occasionally providing a 
windfall to the victim of discrimination.40 
By contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First, Second, and Fifth 
Circuits have avoided adopting this rule, instead emphasizing the need to re-
tain discretion over the offset of such benefits to ensure that pay awards are 
calculated equitably and in accordance with the idiosyncratic circumstances of 
each case.41 In 1983, the Second Circuit engaged in a lengthy analysis in 
Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., to determine whether the plaintiff received a 
larger pension payment from his early discharge than he would have had he 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Id. at 217 (reasoning that every reduction to a discrimination damage award serves to dilute the 
purpose of ending discrimination). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See id. (finding that a reduction in the amount of liquidated damages owed provides a benefit to 
the tortfeasor, a result which is offensive to the intention of the discrimination statute). 
 37 O’Grady, 857 F.2d at 390. 
 38 Id. The court identified the Third Circuit as a persuasive authority on the interplay between 
retirement benefits and damage awards because of the number of cases in which the Third Circuit has 
applied a flat rule barring offset. Id. The court vaguely defines the social policy backing unemploy-
ment and retirement benefits as “social betterment for the benefit of the entire state.” Id. 
 39 See id. at 391 (noting that refusing an offset for the pension benefits will allow the claimant to 
enjoy the benefits of both working and not working, but that such a windfall is preferable when the 
alternative is a “discrimination bonus” for the tortfeasor). 
 40 See id. (acknowledging with approval that the plaintiff in question would be overcompensated 
by the adoption of the rule barring offset). 
 41 Lussier, 50 F.3d at 1110–11 (1st Cir. 1995); see Guthrie, 803 F.2d at 210 (rejecting the creation 
of a rule that would forbid the offset of pension plan benefits from a back pay award); Hagelthorn, 
710 F.2d at 87 (finding that the value of pension benefits was properly offset from a back pay award 
because the plaintiff received a greater lump payment at the time of his discharge than he would have 
received had he retired as planned). 
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retired at normal retirement age.42 The court concluded that the plaintiff was 
better situated by receiving the payments earlier and an offset was accordingly 
due to avoid overcompensation.43 Similarly, in Lussier v. Runyon in 1995, the 
First Circuit affirmed an offset on the basis that an unlawful discharge trig-
gered increases to other streams of income, putting the plaintiff in a better situ-
ation financially than if he had not been discharged at all.44 These courts thus 
emphasized evaluating the totality of circumstances in order to arrive at the 
most equitable damages award.45 
The Fifth Circuit approached the question of offsetting pension payments 
more generally in its 1986 decision of Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co.46 There, the 
Fifth Circuit distinguished between pension payments and the unemployment 
benefits discussed in Gullet Gin Co. by noting that the unemployment benefits 
derive from a public benefit plan with legislatively-mandated employer contri-
butions, whereas pension payments are funded from a company's general as-
sets.47 Thus, the court determined these two benefits to be categorically distinct 
and requiring different treatment.48  
The Fourth Circuit added a new variation to this circuit split in EEOC v. 
Consol Energy.49 There, the court relied upon a distinction between retirement 
benefits paid from a single-employer pension plan and retirement benefits 
housed in a collective fund in refusing to offset to an award of front and back 
pay by the amount received in pension payments.50 The effect of this holding 
is to vary a discrimination damage award based on the type of pension admin-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Hagelthorn, 710 F.2d at 86–87 (comparing the lump sum payment received by the plaintiff 
at age sixty-three with the payment that he would have received at age sixty-five and concluding that 
the greater life expectancy possessed at the time of his unlawful discharge resulted in a larger lump 
sum payment). 
 43 Id. The award was reduced by the difference between the two lump sum amounts. Id. 
 44 See Lussier, 50 F.3d at 1106. The plaintiff received VA benefits for a military-service related 
disability, which were significantly increased as the result of his discharge. Id. 
 45 Id. at 1111; see Hagelthorn, 710 F.2d at 86–87 (evaluating the calculation of the damage award 
based on the specific idiosyncratic circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's discharge). 
46 See Guthrie, 803 F.2d at 209–10 (determining that back pay awards should in general be reduced by 
amounts received from a retirement fund). 
 47 See id. (reasoning that unemployment benefits are funded by contributions the employer is 
statutorily obligated to make, but that pension payments are simply “not collateral”). The court does 
not acknowledge the possibility that employers may be under a similar legal obligation to contribute 
to a retirement fund. See id. (noting an absence of such discussion). 
 48 See id. (refusing an offset for social security benefits while ordering that the back pay award be 
reduced by the total amount received in pension payments). 
 49 See Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 149 (adopting a rule forbidding fringe benefits to be offset 
from a discrimination award of front pay or back pay in the absence of two exceptions: when the 
payment is made directly by the employer to the employee as a form of compensation, and when the 
payment is made in an effort to relieve the employer of liability for the tort). 
 50 See id. (reasoning that a deduction for the pension payments was not owed because they were 
issued by a commingled fund with a third-party administrator). 
270 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
istration a company chooses to utilize rather than the individual circumstances 
in each case, thus tending towards inequitable results.51 
II. COMPOUNDING THE SPLIT IN AUTHORITY  
EEOC v. Consol Energy is the most recent discussion of the deductibility 
of retirement benefits from a discrimination damage award emerging out of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.52 Section A of this Part details 
the factual background, procedural history, and holding of Consol Energy.53 
Section B of this Part discusses the varying ways in which the Fourth Circuit 
has categorized pension payments over time.54 
A. Facts and Procedural History of United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. Consol Energy 
In June 2012, Robinson Run Mine, a subsidiary of Consol Energy, Inc., im-
plemented the use of a biometric hand scanner for the purposes of tracking its 
workers’ attendance.55 This system required all hourly employees to place a hand 
in the scanner upon the start and end of a shift.56 Upon learning of this new sys-
tem, Beverly Butcher, a thirty-seven-year employee of Robinson Run Mine, ap-
proached mine superintendent, Michael Smith, and human resource manager, 
Chris Fazio, to inform them of a religiously based objection to the new technol-
ogy.57 As an evangelical Christian, Butcher believed the scanner rendered him 
with the invisible “Mark of the Beast” thus dooming him to eternal damnation.58 
Smith and Fazio requested that Butcher put this concern into writing, and 
Butcher accordingly provided a letter detailing his belief on June 18, 2012.59 
Smith and Fazio then contacted the manufacturer of the hand scanner, who 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See id. (finding that the damage award would be different if the pension plan were administered 
by the employer rather than a third-party). Many companies that can afford to do so will contract out 
the administration of pension plans to a financial institution or brokerage firm. See Holland & Hart 
LLP, Wake-Up Call for Administrators of Pension Plans, 1 IDAHO EMP’T L. LETTER, June, 1996 
(recommending that companies utilize third-party administrators to decrease their risks of litigation 
over pension disputes). 
 52 See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 
2017) (holding that a pension is a collateral source and therefore should not be deducted from a pay 
award). The Fourth Circuit had previously discussed deducting retirement benefits in Sloas v. CSX 
Transportation.616 F.3d 380, 389 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 53 See infra notes 55–78 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 79–95 and accompanying text. 
 55 Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 4, at 3. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 4. 
 58 Memorandum in Support of EEOC’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Liabil-
ity at 2, Consol Energy, 860 F.3d 131 (No. 1: 13CV00215), 2014 WL 7715194 (noting that Butcher 
testified to subscribing to a biblical interpretation in which followers of the antichrist are designated 
with a mark on the forehead or hand, acceptance of which renders them to an eternity of suffering). 
 59 Id. at 7. 
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drafted a response offering Butcher an alternative interpretation of the bible 
passage discussing the “Mark of the Beast” and suggested that use of the left 
hand eliminated the risk.60 Butcher maintained his objection, and was then in-
formed by Smith and Fazio that he would be expected to use the hand scanner 
and would be disciplined for failure to comply in accordance with the clock-in 
policy in place.61 
Faced with the choice of being branded by the scanner or being terminat-
ed, Butcher tendered his retirement.62 Shortly thereafter, Butcher became 
aware that accommodations had been made for two of his colleagues who were 
physically incapable of using the hand scanner.63 The EEOC brought an en-
forcement action against Consol Energy on September 23, 2013, in the United 
States District Court of West Virginia.64 The complaint and jury trial demand 
alleged a violation of Title VII, which requires employers to reasonably ac-
commodate the religious practices and sincerely held beliefs of employees to 
the extent that they are able to without suffering undue hardship.65 
In its complaint and jury trial demand, the EEOC alleged that Consol En-
ergy maliciously denied religious accommodation to Butcher.66 For relief, the 
EEOC sought a permanent injunction to enjoin Consol Energy from future re-
ligious discrimination, compensation for lost earnings, both endured and ex-
pected, emotional damages, and punitive damages.67 The jury found that Title 
VII’s reasonable accommodation provision had been violated and awarded 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. at 8 (explaining that the letter interpreted a different passage from the Book of Revelation 
than the one Butcher cited in his objection letter, and stated that the antichrist brands only the right 
hand and forehead, rendering the left hand safe for scanning). 
 61 Id. at 13 (noting that Consol adopted a Hand Scanner Policy imposing escalating penalties for 
each missed scan, culminating in effective termination after a fourth occurrence). 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. at 10. Two miners with missing fingers were authorized to manually enter their employee 
identification numbers to record their attendance. Id. 
 64 Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 4, at 1. 
 65 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). The anti-discrimination statute places an affirmative obligation on 
employers to ensure that the employee’s religious needs are met in the workplace. Id. For example, 
where there is an overlap between an employee's work schedule and times of worship, the employer 
has an obligation to remedy the conflict. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2018) (providing methods of allevi-
ating a religiously-based scheduling conflict). Undue hardship is defined as “more than a de minimis 
cost.” Id. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 4, at 1. Butcher first sought to redress his 
grievance through his labor union, which was forced to withdraw its complaint after finding that the 
labor agreement with Consol did not include a requirement to make reasonable religious accommoda-
tions. Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 139. 
 66 Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 4, at 6. 
 67 Id. at 7–9. Title VII provides courts with discretion to issue a broad range of equitable reme-
dies, including injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, attorneys’ 
fees and costs, or “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(1). “Injunction” is defined as an order prohibiting the doing of certain acts. Injunction, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.2014). 
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$150,000 in compensatory damages.68 The district court did not find evidence 
to support an award of punitive damages.69 At an evidentiary hearing on equi-
table remedies, the district court awarded Butcher $436,860.74 in front pay, 
back pay, and lost benefits, and ordered an injunction against Consol Energy 
prohibiting further violations of Title VII.70 In doing so, the court rejected 
Consol’s contention that the pension benefits Butcher received after retiring 
should be offset from the award.71 
Consol Energy appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, filing three post-verdict motions, all three of which were denied in the 
decision rendered June 12, 2017.72 The first contended that judgment as a mat-
ter of law was due because there was insufficient evidence of a conflict be-
tween Butcher’s religious belief and the requirement to use the hand scanner.73 
The court rejected this argument, citing to ample evidence that Butcher’s sin-
cerely held beliefs were in conflict with the requirement that he participate in 
the hand scanner program, and thus found that he necessitated reasonable ac-
commodation.74 Consol Energy also moved for a new trial, positing that the 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 140. The reasonable accommodation provision is violated when an 
employee can prove that he possessed a sincerely held religious belief that stood in conflict with a job 
requirement, the employee made a supervisor aware of such conflict, and was subsequently disci-
plined for not performing the duty in conflict. Id. 
 69 Id. at 136. 
 70 Id. at 140. Back pay provides lost earnings from the time of discharge through the date of set-
tlement. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Cmty. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1993). Front pay exists to com-
pensate a victim of unlawful discrimination for her lost future earnings in the event that reinstatement 
is unavailable. Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1423 (4th Cir. 1991). The courts consider a 
number of factors in determining whether to award front pay over reinstatement, including the exist-
ence of hostility between the former employer and victim, a lack of suitable available positions, and 
the victim’s proximity to retirement age. Id. 
 71 Report or Affidavit of Dr. Sovan Tun, Ph.D., supra note 15, at 3. Also disputed at the post-trial 
remedial hearing was Butcher’s mitigation of damages, with Consol Energy arguing that Butcher did 
not undertake reasonable efforts to find another position within the coal industry because obtaining 
such employment would cause his pension payments to cease. Plaintiff EEOC’s Post-Trial Brief Re-
garding Back Pay and Front Pay Remedies at 18, Consol Energy, 860 F.3d 131 (No. 1:13-cv-00215), 
2015 WL 782931. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that Butcher was reasonably 
diligent in accepting an alternative, lower-paying position after attending numerous job fairs in the 
mining industry without success. Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 148–49. 
 72 Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 140–41. The motions filed by Consol were as follows: (1) Judg-
ment as a Matter of Law per Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that EEOC 
failed to satisfy its burden to establish a prima facie case of a Title VII violation; (2) Motion for a New 
Trial per Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that the jury verdict accepted by 
the court was excessive; and (3) Motion to Amend per Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, disputing the award of front and back pay. Id. 
 73 Id. at 131. Consol argued that Butcher took issue not with the particular hand scanner imple-
mented by the mine but rather with a technological trend towards the tracking of biometric data in 
general. Id. at 132. As evidence for this proposition, Consol cites to Butcher’s June 18 letter, in which 
he wrote, “[e]ven though this hand scanner is not giving a number or a mark, it is a device leading up 
to that time when it will come to fruition.” Id. at 132. 
 74 Id. at 142. 
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district court erred in rejecting the first verdict returned by the jury.75 The court 
denied this motion as well, finding that the district court acted properly in clar-
ifying the law and correcting juror confusion.76 Finally, Consol Energy made a 
motion to amend Butcher’s damages, arguing that it was entitled to an offset 
against the award for the pension benefits received by Butcher after his retire-
ment.77 The court also rejected this argument, holding that a pension is a col-
lateral source and therefore should not be included in the calculation of a front 
or back pay award.78 
B. Competing Jurisprudence in the Fourth Circuit 
In Consol Energy, the Fourth Circuit employed a categorical approach in 
order to clarify its own conflicting position on the offset of employer-funded 
benefits from discrimination pay awards.79 In 1985, in Fariss v. Lynchburg 
Foundry, the Fourth Circuit affirmed an offset of the lump sum pension pay-
ment from the plaintiff’s damage award following an age discrimination 
claim.80 In doing so, the court examined the totality of circumstances and 
found the plaintiff enjoyed a significant financial gain as a result of his unlaw-
ful termination.81 The court reasoned that because the plaintiff had opted for a 
lump sum and forgone a survivorship option, he was only able to collect the 
pension because of his discharge.82 Had he continued working until he passed 
away, he would not have collected a pension at all.83 Thus, the court held that 
because the plaintiff was placed in an economically superior position by virtue 
of collecting his pension earlier, it was necessary to deduct said lump sum in 
an effort to avoid creating a windfall.84 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. at 145; Opening Brief of Appellants at 45, Consol Energy, 860 F.3d 131 (Nos. 16-1230 (L), 
16-1406), 2016 WL 2996820 (arguing that the jury initially returned a verdict that reflected an award 
of nominal damages). 
 76 Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 147 (noting that the court clarified the meaning of compensatory 
damages and performed a post-verdict poll of the jury to ensure that the verdict excluded all compen-
sation for lost wages). 
 77 Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 75, at 53, 56 (contending both that the pension benefit 
was not a collateral source and that Butcher received an additional $78,819 as a result of his dis-
charge). 
 78 Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 149. Consol Energy filed petition for a writ of certiorari on Sep-
tember 11, 2017; petition was denied on February 20, 2018. Consol Energy Inc. v. EEOC, 2018 WL 
942439, U.S., Feb. 20, 2018. 
 79 See Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 150 (distinguishing between payments made directly from 
employer to employee and payments that pass through a third party). 
 80 769 F.2d 958, 966 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 81 Id. at 967 (concluding that the plaintiff received $20,000 more than he would have received 
had he continued working until his date of death). 
 82 Id. at 966. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 967 (stating that the court could not ignore the significant financial advantage enjoyed by the 
plaintiff as a result of his unlawful discharge in affirming the offset of a lump sum pension payment). 
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This decision appeared at odds with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in 2010 in 
Sloas v. CSX Transportation, where the court held that an employer was not 
entitled to an offset for the portion of the disability benefits the employer had 
funded.85 In arriving at this conclusion, the court stated that fringe benefits are 
always considered collateral except when the benefit is provided as compensa-
tion for the injury in question.86 This means that a damages award may only be 
reduced by the amount of payments made in an effort to relieve the employer 
of liability; all other fringe benefits are deemed incidental and excluded from 
offset consideration.87  
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the discrepancy between Sloas and 
Fariss in Consol Energy, and resolved it in favor of the Sloas court’s interpreta-
tion.88 In doing so, the court reiterated the distinction between payments made 
directly to the employee by the employer and payments that are ordered and ad-
ministered by a third party.89 The court categorized the lump sum in Fariss as a 
direct payment because it was issued by the employer to the employee.90 In 
terms of damages, this type of direct payment requires a corresponding reduction 
in an award of front or back pay.91 In Consol, by contrast, the employer pension 
contributions were sent to a third party fund managed and administered by 
Butcher’s union.92 The court stated that this separation between the time of con-
tribution and time of payment indicated that the pension was standard compo-
nent of Butcher’s compensation.93 As such, the court argued that providing an 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See 616 F.3d at 389 (holding that the United States District Court for the District of West Virginia 
did not err in refusing to offset disability payments from an injured railroad worker’s negligence award). 
 86 See id. at 390 (creating a binary test distinguishing between payments that the employer has 
voluntarily taken to indemnify itself against possible liability, and all other benefits). 
 87 See id. (finding that all benefits are collateral aside from those made to indemnify the employer 
from tort liability). 
 88 See Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 150 (acknowledging that, if read broadly, the holdings of Sloas 
and Fariss are in conflict). 
 89 Id. at 149 (observing that Consol Energy made contributions to a collective fund managed by 
the United Mine Workers Association as per a requirement in its collective bargaining agreement). 
 90 Id. (placing an emphasis on the fact that in Fariss, the payment was made directly to the em-
ployee from the employer without passing through a commingled fund). 
 91 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. O’Grady, 857 F.2d 383, 391 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that a payment direct from the employer is not collateral, and therefore should be offset against a 
damages award). 
 92 Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 150. Factors that other circuits have looked to in order to determine 
if a pension is a collateral source include the following: (1) the employee’s contributions to the plan, 
(2) the existence of a collective bargaining agreement providing the terms of the pension, (3) whether 
the plan contemplates injuries sustained both at and outside of work, (4) the employee’s service re-
quirements in earning the pension, and (5) the presence of a set-off provision in the event of a tort 
action. See Hamlin v. Charter Twp. of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 435 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing the same set of 
factors for evaluating whether pension benefits were collateral); Phillips v. W. Co. of N. Am., 953 
F.2d 923, 932 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing a list of five factors useful in determining if a payment is a fringe 
benefit). 
 93 Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 149–50. 
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offset for the pension would allow Consol to unjustly reduce its liability.94 In 
other words, a reduction in the damages award for the pension payments would 
allow Consol to escape a portion of financial responsibility for its unlawful be-
havior.95 
III. REDIRECTING THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has been inconsistent in its treatment 
of deductions for pension payments over time.96 This Part examines the unre-
solved conflict in EEOC v. Consol Energy, and argues for an approach to cal-
culating damage awards that emphasizes the principles of equity.97   
There are a number of general policy considerations underpinning the col-
lateral source rule that have contributed to its widespread adoption.98 Unfortu-
nately, none of these rationales are cited by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit in its confusing and perhaps even contradictory approach to the 
offset of benefits funded in whole or in part by the employer.99 Instead, the 
Fourth Circuit relied on arbitrary distinctions to create a policy through which 
two identically situated claimants may receive widely variant remedies, a re-
sult that is antagonistic to both the remedy provision of Title VII and the na-
ture of equitable damages.100 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See id. at 149 (highlighting the fact that Butcher would have been entitled to the pension re-
gardless of the Title VII violation, unlike a payment made individually to Butcher to compensate him 
for injuries suffered). 
 95 See id. (reasoning that allowing an offset for the pension payments would allow Consol to 
avoid its contractual obligation to provide retirement benefits to Butcher).  
 96 Compare U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131, 150 
(4th Cir. 2017) (refusing an offset for pension payments received following constructive discharge), 
with Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 966 (4th Cir. 1985) (deducting the entirety of a lump 
sum pension payment from a damages award). See also Sloas v. CSX Transp., 616 F.3d 380, 389 (4th 
Cir. 2010) (creating a rule that fringe benefits are always collateral and therefore not deductible from a 
damages award). 
 97 See infra notes 98–122 and accompanying text. 
 98 See DOBBS, supra note 17, at  267–69 (including the following as rationales for the rule: (1) in 
the case of benefits that come as gifts, the defendant should not be able to take credit for the gratuity 
of others, (2) preserving the subrogation rights of insurers, (3) in the case of insurance payments, 
ensuring that the plaintiff is able to receive the full benefits for which he paid through premiums, and 
(4) avoiding a windfall to the tortfeasor). 
 99 See Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 149–50 (noting that the court is silent as to the policy consider-
ations generally associated with the collateral source rule); see also infra notes 82–88 and accompany-
ing text. 
 100 See e.g., Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 150 (implying that the damage award for Butcher would 
have been reduced had his pension payments been managed by Consol rather than a third-party); see 
also Thomas W. Lee, Deducting Unemployment Compensation and Ending Employment Discrimina-
tion: Continuing Conflict, 43 EMORY L.J. 325, 336–37 (1994) (identifying a lack of uniformity in 
damage awards within lower courts that rely on this definitional distinction). Equitable remedies are 
characterized by their necessary rejection of bright-line rules. See Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 
1110 (1st Cir. 1995) (engaging in a prolonged discussion of the nature of equity and emphasizing its 
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It is first necessary to examine the competing stances in Fariss v. Lynch-
burg County and EEOC v. Consol Energy on the categorization of pension bene-
fits.101 The holding in Fariss is clear: a fringe benefit triggered by an employee’s 
unlawful discharge may be reduced from an award of damages if it places the 
employee in an economically superior position than had the discharge never oc-
curred.102 The court arrives at this conclusion not by labeling the pension benefit 
interim earnings, but rather by referencing the principles of equity, conducting a 
holistic examination of the damage award, and concluding that offsetting the 
lump sum pension payment is necessary to avoid a windfall.103 
In Consol Energy, the Fourth Circuit states that it need not address this 
holding from Fariss because Consol is decided on a significantly different set of 
facts; namely, that the pension payment in Fariss came directly from the em-
ployer whereas the pension payments in Consol were distributed by the third-
party union.104 This is an artificial distinction for the purposes of determining 
whether the pension represents interim earnings or collateral payments.105 In 
both cases, the sole funder of the pension payments was the employer, and the 
benefits arose out of a contractual employment agreement that made contribu-
tions contingent upon the length of the plaintiffs’ service.106 Furthermore, the 
plaintiff in either instance received a clear monetary advantage from collecting 
his pension at an earlier date.107 Thus, the pension benefits were from similar 
sources, were similar in nature, and provided similar windfalls to the plaintiff, 
creating clear tension that remained unresolved in Consol Energy.108 Despite this 
close resemblance of facts, Fariss resulted in an offset, and Consol did not.109 
                                                                                                                           
hallmarks of flexibility and particularity). The remedy provision of Title VII calls for “equitable relief 
as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012). 
 101 See Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 149 (resolving pension payments to be a collateral source); 
Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 967 (4th Cir. 1985) (determining pension benefit to be a 
fringe benefit and accordingly set off from plaintiff’s losses). 
 102 See Fariss, 769 F.2d at 967 (reasoning that an equitable damages award should serve to make 
the victim of discrimination whole, but should not provide a windfall). 
 103 See id. (reasoning that the plaintiff was better situated by $20,000 as a result of his untimely 
discharge). The court declines to analyze whether the pension benefits are collateral in nature. See id. 
(noting silence on the categorization of the benefit). 
 104 Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 150 (declining to find tension between Fariss and Consol Energy 
because the pension benefits received by Butcher were not the same type as those enjoyed by the 
plaintiff in Fariss). 
 105 See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Enter. Ass’n Steamfitters Local No. 638, 542 
F.2d 579, 591 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding the identity of the administrator of the fund to be irrelevant 
where the employer is the sole source of the payments). 
 106 Fariss, 769 F.2d at 962; Defendants’ Post-Trial Brief Regarding Back Pay and Front Pay 
Remedies at 8, Consol Energy, 860 F.3d 131 (No. 1:13CV00215), 2015 WL 782910. 
 107 See Fariss, 769 F.2d at 967 (noting that pension paid out $20,000 to plaintiff as a result of his 
early discharge); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, Consol Energy, 860 F.3d 131 (No. 17-380), 
2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3446 (stating that Butcher received $78,303 more than he would have 
had he continued working through his intended retirement date). 
 108 See infra notes 117–118 and accompanying text. 
 109 Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 150; Fariss, 769 F.2d at 967. 
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The Fourth Circuit’s adoption of this narrow, categorical approach to de-
termining damage questions undermines the statutory intent of Title VII’s rem-
edy provisions.110 Title VII calls for equitable relief to be provided in the wake 
of unlawful discrimination.111 It is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of 
a situation’s particularities to ensure that the victim is returned to his or her 
rightful position monetarily.112 Imposing a rule that automatically triggers or 
blocks an offset on the basis of a technical distinction is adverse to the essen-
tial goal of equity in Title VII discrimination cases.113 
Advocates of the bright line rule from the Fourth Circuit would likely 
counter that allowing the deduction of pension and other fringe benefits from 
award of front and back pay undermines Title VII’s statutory objective of de-
terring discrimination in the workplace.114 Rendering a plaintiff more than 
whole, however, achieves a punitive effect on the tortfeasor, which is incon-
sistent with Title VII’s objectives.115 Punitive remedies are provided for in the 
statute and acknowledged by the Fourth Circuit to be available only in limited 
circumstances.116 It thus exceeds the scope of the equitable remedy provision 
to force the employer to pay twice for the same injury.117 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has adopted an ap-
proach for handling collateral source determination that better aligns with the 
nature of equitable awards.118 Following the court's earlier decisions disfavor-
                                                                                                                           
 110 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (providing that courts should provide for equitable relief). 
Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975) (stating that all Title VII 
remedies should be examined in light of the goals of ending unlawful discrimination in the workforce, 
and making whole victims who have endured unlawful discrimination), with Consol Energy, 860 F.3d 
at 149 (adopting a binary test that considers solely the source of the benefit in rendering a collateral 
source designation). 
 111 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). 
 112 See Lussier, 50 F.3d at 1112 (encouraging courts to view pay awards in discrimination cases 
as part of a larger remedial endeavor, not a singular solution). 
 113 See Moody, 422 U.S. at 417–18 (describing the statutory goals of Title VII); Lussier, 50 F.3d 
at 1110 (describing the nature of equity as necessarily rejecting rigid tests in favor of discretion). 
 114 See Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 85 (3d Cir. 1983) (arguing that the preventative 
goal of Title VII is more effectively served by adopting firm standards against the offset of fringe 
benefits from back pay awards). 
 115 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. O’Grady, 857 F.2d 383, 391 (7th Cir. 1988) (de-
scribing compensation that renders a plaintiff more than whole as a “discrimination bonus”). 
 116 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); Consol Energy, 860 F.3d at 150–51 (stating that punitive damages 
are available only in egregious instances of discrimination in which the employer can be shown to 
have acted maliciously); see also Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose, Intent in Disability Dis-
crimination Law, 56 B.C.L. REV. 1417, 1439 (2015) (noting that when Title VII was originally enact-
ed, it permitted only equitable relief; punitive remedies were not added to the statute until its expan-
sion in 1991). 
 117 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1210 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that an employer is entitled to offset damages that exceed the amount the plaintiff 
would have received had he not been wrongfully terminated). 
 118 See Dailey v. Societe Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 461 (2d Cir. 1997); Lussier, 50 F.3d at 1110 
(describing the central characteristic of equitable awards to be flexibility and discretion); Lee, supra 
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ing the bright line approach to the deductibility of fringe benefits, the Second 
Circuit acknowledged the compelling reasons why a district court might de-
cline to offset benefits partially funded by the employer in Dailey v. Societe 
Generale in 1997.119 Specifically, the court noted the distasteful possibility of 
conferring a windfall to the wrongdoer.120 Despite this, the court retained its 
position that, as the forum with the soundest understanding of the idiosyncra-
sies of the situation, the question of offset should remain firmly within the dis-
cretion of the district court.121 This approach ensures that victims of unlawful 
employment discrimination are made whole without overstepping the bounda-
ries clearly laid out by the statutory text of Title VII.122 
CONCLUSION 
When considering how to best correct the injustice of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination, district courts should be provided the opportunity to 
weigh every fact and circumstance of each individual plaintiff. The ability to 
examine facts and determine damages on a case-by-case basis is hampered by 
the adoption of a bright line rule classifying certain fringe benefits as collateral 
sources rather than interim earnings. By labeling a fringe benefit a collateral 
source, the damage award is not reduced by amounts already paid by the em-
ployer to the employee. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred 
in adopting such a categorical approach, and in doing so, came in direct con-
flict with its previous decisions which emphasized the need to evaluate the 
award in terms of equity rather than rigid rules. Moving forward, the holding 
in EEOC v. Consol Energy may result in awards that exceed the scope of the 
enforcement provision of Title VII and lead to widely variant damage awards 
for similarly situated victims of employment discrimination. 
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note 100, at 346 (explaining the primary purpose of any equitable remedy as placing the employee in 
the position he would have enjoyed but for the unlawful discrimination suffered). 
 119 Dailey, 108 F.3d at 461 (observing that a wrongfully discharged employee likely suffers many 
non-compensable and incidental losses, and therefore the additional burden should rest with the party 
more capable of paying). 
 120 See id. (noting that declining to reduce a back pay award by the amount of a fringe benefit 
may result in a windfall for the discriminatory employer). 
 121 Id. 
 122 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see Moody, 422 U.S. at 417–18 (identifying the twin aims of Title 
VII to be ending unlawful discrimination in the workforce and making whole victims who have en-
dured unlawful discrimination); Dailey, 108 F.3d at 461. 
